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A DSGE model with a Taylor rule is augmented with an evolutionary switching 
between technical and fundamental analyses in currency trade, where the fractions 
of these trading tools are determined within the model. Then, a shock hits the 
economy. As a result, chaotic dynamics and long swings may occur in the 
exchange rate, which are appealing features of the model given existing empirical 
evidence on chaos and long swings in exchange rate fluctuations. 
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Rahapolitiikan korkosäännön vaikutus valuuttakurssin 
dynaamisiin vaihteluihin avotaloudessa 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 19/2007 
Mikael Bask 




Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan valuuttamarkkinoiden kaupankäyntistrategioiden 
dynaamisia vaikutuksia avotaloudessa. Avotalouden dynaamista käyttäytymistä 
kuvataan rahapolitiikan korkosäännöllä täydennetyllä modernilla dynaamisen sto-
kastisen yleisen tasapainon makromallilla. Valuuttamarkkinoilla kauppaa käyvät 
valitsevat vaihtoehtoisesti teknisen analyysin tai rakennemallin valuuttakaupan 
apuvälineeksi. Tällöin teknisen kaupankäynnin levinneisyys valuuttamarkkinoilla 
määräytyy mallissa endogeenisesti. Tarkastelun tulosten mukaan eksogeenisen 
häiriön iskettyä talouteen nimellisen valuuttakurssin muutokset saattavat kestää 
pitkään ja dynaaminen sopeutuminen kohti tasapainoa voi olla kaoottista. Tulok-
set ovat sikäli rohkaisevia, että asianmukaisen empiirisen näytön mukaan 
valuuttakurssien dynamiikka voi olla kaaosmaista ja niiden muutokset näyttävät 
kestävän pitkään. 
 
Avainsanat: kaoottinen dynamiikka, valuuttamarkkinat, rahapolitiikka, tekninen 
analyysi, rakenneanalyysi 
 








2  A prototype DSGE model................................................................................8 
 
3  Trading strategies in currency trade..............................................................9 
 
4  A Taylor rule in policy-making.....................................................................11 
 

















How is the behavior of the economy aﬀected when technical analysis is used in
currency trade and the central bank is using a Taylor rule in policy-making?
What kind of dynamics can be observed? Are there some features of the
economy that are observed in data?
Model setup
A dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model is augmented with
an evolutionary switching between technical and fundamental analyses in
currency trade, where the fractions of these trading tools are determined
within the model due to a mechanism suggested by Brock and Hommes (1997).
Speciﬁcally, currency traders choose between costly rational expectation
forecasts and free trend extrapolations, where the fractions of these tools are
determined by their relative performance in currency trade.
The central bank is using a policy-rule in which the interest rate is set
in response to the output gap, the inﬂation rate, the exchange rate change,
but also in response to the output gap in the previous time period to mimic
optimal policy under commitment. Thus, we include a ‘commitment term’ in
the Taylor rule, even though we do not explicitly derive an optimal policy rule
for the central bank. However, the inclusion of the previous output gap in the
policy-rule might give a glimpse of an idea for future research.
Main ﬁndings
Two ﬁndings stick out. Firstly, we may have chaotic dynamics in the exchange
rate when the intensity of choice of the best trading strategy in currency trade
is large enough and when there is a ‘commitment term’ in the Taylor rule.
However, if the previous output gap is not included in the policy-rule, the
dynamics become non-chaotic, which is an interesting ﬁnding since it is a
counter-intuitive result from an economic point of view. When it comes to
chaotic dynamics in exchange rates, the empirical results are mixed (see Bask,
1996—2002, Das and Das, 2007, and references therein).
A second ﬁnding is that we may have long swings in the exchange rate,
which also is interesting since Engel and Hamilton (1990) have found long
swings in exchange rates for the US Dollar. The origin of their research was
the strong appreciation of the US Dollar in the early 1980s and the subsequent
depreciation of the same currency in the second half of the same decade.
Therefore, since we are not aware of any model that is able to generate this
type of behavior in the exchange rate, we believe that our model could be a
fruitful starting point for future research.
Relation to the literature
The mechanism in Brock and Hommes (1997) has been adopted in several
papers in which diﬀerent trading tools are available in asset trade (see Brock
et al, 2006, Brock and Hommes, 1998, Chiarella et al, 2006, and De Grauwe
and Grimaldi, 2006a, for an exchange rate application), but there are also
7papers in which the fractions of trading tools are determined endogenously in
ad i ﬀerent fashion (see Bask, 2007a, and Bask and Selander, 2007a, for two
exchange rate applications).
An evolutionary switching between trading strategies in currency trade
has never been implemented into a DSGE model that includes a Taylor rule
for the central bank, but there are papers in which the fractions of trading
tools are exogenously given (see Bask, 2007b, Bask and Selander, 2007b, and
Pierdzioch, 2005, for a model without an interest rate rule). Branch and
McGough (2006) is a closely related paper to our paper since the mechanism
in Brock and Hommes (1997) is implemented into a DSGE model but for a
closed economy. They introduce heterogeneity in the forecasts of the output
gap and the inﬂation rate, and ﬁnd complicated dynamics in the economy.1
Organization of the paper
A prototype DSGE model is presented in Section 2, whereas the trading
strategies in currency trade, including the mechanism in Brock and Hommes
(1997), are in focus in Section 3. Thereafter, in Section 4, we present the
Taylor rule that the central bank is using in policy-making, and, in Section 5,
we analyze the behavior of the economy. Section 6 concludes the paper with
a discussion.
2 A prototype DSGE model
The prototype model consists of IS and AS curves for the domestic economy
½
xt = Et (xt+1) − α(rt − Et (πd,t+1))
πd,t = βEt (πd,t+1)+γxt + δrt + εt
(2.1)
where x is the output gap, r is the interest rate, πd is the domestic inﬂation
rate, and ε is a cost-push shock. Thus, even though there is an endogenous
cost channel in the AS curve, we also allow for exogenous cost-push shocks.
However, we will only make use of a shock in the initial time period when
analyzing the model since our focus is on its behavior when there are no
transients. Finally, Et (·) is rational expectations of the variable in focus,
conditioned on the structure of the complete model and realized values of all
variables in the model up to and including time t,m e a n i n gt h a tt h ed a t i n go f
expectations is time t.
The model in (2.1) can be viewed as Galí and Monacelli’s (2005) DSGE
model for a small open economy that has been augmented with a cost channel.
Barth and Ramey (2001) and Chowdhury et al (2006) provide empirical
evidence for a cost channel, meaning that ﬁrms’ marginal costs are directly
aﬀected by the interest rate. The intuition is that ﬁr m sh a v et op a yt h e i r
production factors before they receive revenues from selling their products,
and, therefore, need to borrow money from ﬁnancial intermediaries. Based on
1 See Hommes (2006) for a literature survey on heterogeneous agent models in economics
and ﬁnance, and De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006b) for an introduction to exchange rate
determination in a behavioral ﬁnance framework.
8this intuition, Ravenna and Walsh (2006) derive a DSGE model with a cost
channel. Therefore, the model in (2.1) can also be viewed as an open economy
version of their model.
Unfortunately, there are no exchange rate terms in (2.1) that is necessary
when incorporating market expectations in currency trade into the model.
H o w e v e r ,i ti sp o s s i b l et or e w r i t e( 2 . 1 )u s i n ge q u a t i o n st h a ta r ed e r i v e di nG a l í
and Monacelli (2005) to have a model that includes exchange rate terms. As a
secondary eﬀect, the IS and AS curves for the domestic economy are no longer













πt = βEt (πt+1)+γ (1 − ζ)xt + δ(1 − ζ)rt + ζ
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where e is the exchange rate that is the domestic price of the foreign currency,
t∆e
e,m
t+1 is the expected exchange rate change according to the market that is
dated at time t,a n dζ ∈ [0,1] is an index of openness of the economy. See the
Appendix for a derivation of (2.2).
A third equation in the prototype model, which is derived in Galí and




Note that we have ignored variables in the foreign economy in (2.2)—(2.3) since
these variables can be treated as constants.
We will now look into what determines the expected exchange rate change
according to the market.
3 Trading strategies in currency trade
When fundamental analysis is used in currency trade, agents have rational
expectations regarding the next time period’s exchange rate change
t∆e
e,fa
t+1 = Et (∆et+1) (3.1)
where the cost of using fundamental analysis is c. Further on, when technical
analysis is used in currency trade, which is free to use, agents extrapolate the
trend in the exchange rate
t∆e
e,ta
t+1 = η∆et (3.2)
where η is the strength in trend extrapolations.
The reason that we incorporate technical analysis into the model is that
questionnaire surveys made at currency markets around the world reveal that
currency trade to a large extent not only is determined by an economy’s
performance or expected performance. In fact, a non-negligible fraction is
guided by technical analysis, meaning that past exchange rates are assumed
9t op r o v i d ei n f o r m a t i o na b o u tf u t u r ee x c h a n g er a t em o v e m e n t s . 2 Also, because
of Friedman’s (1953) argument that ‘irrational’ traders cannot survive in the
market since they would loose money, and, therefore, be driven out of the
market, we believe that it is important that the fractions of the trading tools
in currency trade are determined within the model.
Now, the expected exchange rate change according to the market is
t∆e
e,m
t+1 = ωt ·t ∆e
e,ta
t+1 +( 1− ωt) ·t ∆e
e,fa
t+1 (3.3)
where ω ∈ [0,1] is the weight attached to technical analysis, which is












where θ is the intensity in which agents switch from one trading strategy to the
other. Speciﬁcally, when θ =0 , agents are insensitive to the performance of the
trading strategies, whereas when θ →∞ , all weight is attached to the trading
strategy that has performed better. Thus, the weights attached to technical
and fundamental analyses are updated by the probabilities according to the
l o g i tm o d e ls i n c ew ea s s u m et h a tt h en u m ber of currency traders that use each
trading tool is large (see Manski and McFadden, 1981). Also, since we assume
a ﬁnite θ, we take into account the ‘status quo bias’ that is revealed in the
psychological literature (see Kahneman et al, 1991).
Turning to the performance of the trading strategies, it is the most recent





















− c = −c
(3.5)
Of course, one could argue that the expected performance of the trading
strategies is more suitable when agents can choose the rational expectation
forecast in currency trade. However, this would cause an inconsistency
p r o b l e ms i n c e ,t ob ea b l et oe v a l u a t et h ee x p e c t e dp e r f o r m a n c eo ft h et r a d i n g
strategies, agents have to know the exchange rate change according to rational
expectations in advance. To pose a rhetorical question, why should agents
choose technical analysis when they know the rational expectation forecast?3
2 See Oberlechner (2004) for an in-depth discussion of two large questionnaire surveys
conducted at the European and the North American markets, Gehrig and Menkhoﬀ (2006)
for a survey on trading behavior that includes references to several other surveys made
at currency markets (eg, Cheung and Chinn, 2001, Lui and Mole, 1998, Menkhoﬀ, 1997,
Oberlechner, 2001, and Taylor and Allen, 1992), and Neely (1997) for a layman’s guide on
technical analysis.
3 Brock et al (2006) propose a solution to this problem, in the context of an asset pricing
model, by saying that there is an expert manager who sells the rational expectation forecast.
However, they have to implement this expert manager into the model in such a way that
agents are not able to derive this forecast for free. We do not ﬁnd this setup convincing, and
Brock et al (2006) do not either claim that it is a realistic description of market behavior,
meaning that we instead assume that agents evaluate technical and fundamental analyses
by their most recent performance in currency trade.
10We will now close the model with an interest rate rule for the central bank,
before we analyze the behavior of the model.
4 A Taylor rule in policy-making
In 1993, Taylor (1993) demonstrated that Federal Reserve’s policy could be
described by the following interest rate rule
rt =0 .04 + 0.5(yt − y)+1 .5(πt − 0.02) (4.1)
where r is Federal Reserve’s operating target for the funds rate, y is real GDP,
y is potential real GDP, meaning that y − y i st h eo u t p u tg a p ,a n dπ is the
inﬂation rate according to the GDP deﬂator. This rule has been the center of
attention in the monetary policy literature since it was presented and is often
referred to as a Taylor rule, and Taylor (1999) argues that since the rule in
(4.1) describes Federal Reserve’s policy during a successful period, one should
adopt a rule like this in policy-making.
For this reason, the central bank is using a Taylor rule in the model when
setting the interest rate, and responds to the output gap, the CPI inﬂation rate,
the exchange rate change, and the output gap in the previous time period when
making its policy-decision
rt = κ1xt−1 + κ2xt + κ3πt + κ4∆et (4.2)
The inclusion of the previous output gap in the rule is motivated by the fact
that such a term shows up in rules when the central bank commits to a policy
that is optimal over time. Therefore, even though we do not explicitly derive
an optimal policy rule for the central bank, we include a ‘commitment term’
when analyzing the behavior of the model to see the eﬀects.4
5 The behavior of the economy
We illustrate our ﬁndings using the following calibrated values of the structural
parameters: α = 1
2 since it has been estimated to be 1
2.04 and 1
1.86 for the US
economy (see Levin et al, 2005, and Lubik and Schorfheide, 2004); β =0 .99;
γ =0 .072 since this is an estimate for the US economy under the assumption
of unit intertemporal substitution elasticities in consumption and labor supply
(see Chowdhury et al, 2006, for details); δ =0 .03 since this is an estimate
for the US economy (see Chowdhury et al, 2006); and ζ =0 .4,w h i c hi st h e
parameter setting in Galí and Monacelli (2005).
We assume that the economy is hit by a cost-push shock in the initial
time period when it is in steady state, ε0 =0 .1, but that there are no shocks
thereafter, εt =0 , t>0. Moreover, the cost of using fundamental analysis in
4 See Clarida et al (1999) for an exposition of interest rate rules in DSGE models, and
Zimmermann (2003) for a more introductory text on the same topic. Woodford’s (2003)
seminal work on interest rate rules in policy-making should also be part of the reading list.
11currency trade is c =0 .1, the strength in trend extrapolations in the exchange
rate is η =0 .9, and the intensity in which agents switch from one trading
strategy in currency trade to the other is θ =5 . However, when we search for
periodic cycles in the economy, the aforementioned parameters belong to the
sets c ∈ [0,1], η ∈ [0,2] and θ ∈ [0,20].
Obviously, the economy’s behavior can be described in numerous ways.
Also, since we are dealing with a non-linear dynamic system, several of the
ﬁndings are sensitive to the parameter setting. For example, as we will see
below, cycles of diﬀerent orders may be close in parameter space, meaning
that small changes in one of the parameters constantly change the order of
the cycle. However, when the intensity of choice of the best trading strategy
in currency trade is large enough, we almost always have chaotic dynamics in
the economy when there is a ‘commitment term’ in the Taylor rule. In fact,
it is not necessary to have an endogenous cost channel in the model to have
chaotic dynamics.
The length of a time series in the calculations is 1000 time periods,
where the ﬁrst 100 periods is excluded to avoid transients. Thus, there is a
fundamental diﬀerence between our analysis and the analysis of typical DSGE
models. In the latter models, the focus is on the transients’ behavior, whereas
we focus on the dynamics when the transients have disappeared. The reason
is that the economy returns to a unique steady state in typical DSGE models,
meaning that there are no dynamics to study when there are no transients.
As we will see below, this is clearly not the case in our model. We use ‘E&F
Chaos’ when analyzing the model (see Diks et al, 2006).
Periodic cycles in the economy
We start the analysis by looking at ﬁgures that show the presence of cycles of
diﬀerent orders in the economy. In the ﬁrst ﬁgure, we make use of the ﬁndings
i nC l a r i d ae ta l( 2 0 0 0 )f o rt h eU Se c o n o m yd u r i n gt h eV o l c k e r - G r e e n s p a n
period and set κ2 =0 .5 and κ3 =1 .5 in the Taylor rule. Turning to the
parameters for the ‘commitment term’ and the exchange rate change in the
rule, they belong to the sets κ1 ∈ [−2,0] and κ4 ∈ [−1,1]. See Figure 1 for
periodic cycles of order 1 (blue), 2 (red), 4 (yellow), 6 (orange) and 8 (green).
12Figure 1. Periodic cycles of order 1 (blue), 2 (red), 4 (yellow), 6
(orange) and 8 (green) when the rule is rt = κ1xt−1+0.5xt+1.5πt+κ4∆et.
κ1 ∈ [−2,0] is on the horizontal axis, and κ4 ∈ [−1,1] is on the vertical
axis. c =0 .1, η =0 .9 and θ =5 .
13The message in the ﬁgure is that the 2-cycle is a common feature of the
economy for the parameter settings investigated, but also that there are cycles
of orders 4, 6 and 8 in the economy. Since the structural parameters in the
model are based on quarterly data, the length of these cycles range from half of
ay e a rt o2 years. Further on, because the economy is never globally unstable
for the parameter settings examined, the white areas in the ﬁgure must contain
cycles of higher orders5, a-periodic cycles or even more complicated dynamics.
More on this below when searching for chaotic dynamics in the economy.
In the second ﬁgure, we have set the parameters for the ‘commitment term’
and the exchange rate change in the Taylor rule to κ1 = −1 and κ4 = −0.5.
This is because the ﬁrst parameter in a typical DSGE model with optimal
policy-making has a negative value (see Evans and Honkapohja, 2006), and
that an expansionary policy in case of a depreciating exchange rate is a
reasonable assumption to make. The parameters in focus are now the cost
of using fundamental analysis in currency trade and the intensity in which
agents switch from one trading strategy in currency trade to the other, and
they belong to the sets c ∈ [0,1] and θ ∈ [0,20]. See Figure 2 for periodic
cycles of the same orders as above.
Also in this ﬁgure, the message is that the 2-cycle is a common feature
of the economy for the parameter settings investigated, but a diﬀerence is
now that higher-order cycles are more common, especially the 6-cycle. Again,
the white areas in the ﬁgure may hide more complicated dynamics since the
economy is never globally unstable for the parameter settings examined.
The convexities that are visible in the ﬁg u r ea r es t a b l ef o rd i ﬀerent
parameter settings. Loosely speaking, these convexities mean that if, for
example, the economy is characterized by a 4-cycle, then, to still have a 4-cycle
in the economy when the cost of using fundamental analysis in currency trade
increases, the intensity in which agents switch from one trading strategy in
currency trade to the other must decrease.
T h ep a r a m e t e r si nf o c u si nt h et h i r dﬁgure are the strength in trend
extrapolations in the exchange rate and, again, the intensity of choice of the
best trading strategy in currency trade, and they belong to the sets η ∈ [0,2]
and θ ∈ [0,20].S e eF i g u r e3f o rp e r i o d i cc y c l e so ft h es a m eo r d e r sa sa b o v e .
Compared with previous ﬁgures, it is now relatively common that the
economy is in rest, even though the 2-cycle still dominates when examining
diﬀerent parameter settings. Periodic cycles of order 4 are also slightly more
common than previously, but cycles of order 6 are now less common. Another
feature of the model that is visible in the ﬁgure, especially when the strength
in trend extrapolations in the exchange rate is large, is that cycles of diﬀerent
orders are close in parameter space, meaning that small changes in one of the
parameters constantly change the order of the cycle.
A bifurcation diagram is found in Figure 4, where the bifurcation parameter
is the intensity in which agents switch from one trading strategy in currency
trade to the other. This parameter belongs to the set θ ∈ [0,20], and typical
bifurcation routes to more complicated dynamics are visible in the ﬁgure, where
t h ee x c h a n g er a t ec h a n g ei so nt h ev e r t i c a la x i s .
5 This is because we have not found periodic cycles of order 3, 5 and 7.
14Figure 2. Periodic cycles of order 1 (blue), 2 (red), 4 (yellow), 6
(orange) and 8 (green) when the rule is rt = −xt−1+0.5xt+1.5πt−0.5∆et.
θ ∈ [0,20] is on the horizontal axis, and c ∈ [0,1] is on the vertical axis.
η =0 .9.
15Figure 3. Periodic cycles of order 1 (blue), 2 (red), 4 (yellow), 6
(orange) and 8 (green) when the rule is rt = −xt−1+0.5xt+1.5πt−0.5∆et.
θ ∈ [0,20] is on the horizontal axis, and η ∈ [0,2] is on the vertical
axis. c =0 .1.
16Figure 4. Bifurcation diagram when the rule is rt = −xt−1+0.5xt+1.5πt−
0.5∆et. θ ∈ [0,20] is on the horizontal axis, which is the bifurcation
parameter, and ∆et ∈ [−1,1] is on the vertical axis. c =0 .1 and η =0 .9.
17Let us now shift focus from periodic cycles in the economy to more complicated
dynamics, such as chaotic dynamics, that may be hidden in the white areas in
previous ﬁgures.
Chaotic dynamics and long swings in the economy
A typical result in the asset pricing literature that make use of the mechanism
in Brock and Hommes (1997) is the presence of chaotic dynamics when the
intensity of choice of the best trading strategy in asset trade is large enough
(see Brock et al, 2006, Brock and Hommes, 1997—1998, and Chiarella et al,
2006). For this reason, but also encouraged by Figure 4 above, we search
for chaotic dynamics in the model. The characterizing feature of this type
of dynamics is the property of ‘sensitive dependence on initial conditions’:
any two trajectories with arbitrarily close, but not equal, initial conditions
will diverge from each other at exponential rates. Globally, however, the
trajectories are bounded.
An operational deﬁnition of chaotic dynamics is that the largest Lyapunov
exponent should be positive, and this is because this exponent measures the
average exponential convergence or divergence of two trajectories with nearby,
but not equal, initial conditions. Therefore, in Figure 5, the largest Lyapunov
exponent as a function of the intensity in which agents switch from one trading
strategy in currency trade to the other is shown.
Clearly, the economy is characterized by chaotic dynamics when the
aforementioned switching between trading strategies is intense enough. Also,
by comparing Figures 4 and 5, one can see that areas in the bifurcation diagram
that seems to contain more complicated dynamics most often are associated
with a positive largest Lyapunov exponent, meaning that we have chaotic
dynamics.
In Figure 6, a typical exchange rate change series is plotted when the
economy is characterized by chaotic dynamics, where the intensity of choice
of the best trading strategy in currency trade is θ =1 5 , and the length of the
time series is 400 time periods.
Besides that cycles in the economy never repeats itself exactly, it is also
clear in the ﬁgure that there are cycles at diﬀerent frequencies, both high and
low frequencies. Thus, if we start with the latter observation, it seems that the
model is able to reproduce the long swings that Engel and Hamilton (1990)
found in exchange rates for the US Dollar. When it comes to chaotic dynamics
in exchange rates, the empirical results are mixed (see Bask, 1996—2002, Das
and Das, 2007, and references therein).
18Figure 5. The largest Lyapunov exponent, λ1 ∈ [−0.5,0.5],a saf u n c t i o n
of θ ∈ [0,20] when the rule is rt = −xt−1 +0 .5xt +1 .5πt −0.5∆et. c =0 .1
and η =0 .9.T h e r ei sc h a o t i cd y n a m i c sw h e nλ1 > 0.
19Figure 6. At i m es e r i e sf o r∆et w h e nt h er u l ei srt = −xt−1 +0 .5xt +
1.5πt − 0.5∆et. c =0 .1, η =0 .9 and θ =1 5 .
206 Discussion
Main ﬁndings
Our aim has been to examine how the use of technical analysis in currency
trade may aﬀect the behavior of the economy when the central bank is using a
Taylor rule in policy-making. Two ﬁndings stick out: (i) chaotic dynamics in
the exchange rate may occur when the intensity of choice of the best trading
strategy in currency trade is large enough and when there is a ‘commitment
term’ in the Taylor rule; and (ii) long swings in the exchange rate may also
occur under the same circumstances.
If we start with the ﬁrst ﬁnding, the predictability of monetary policy
might get lost for agents in the economy, which is an important ingredient
in the present-day era of independent central banks, openness and inﬂation
rate targeting, at least among central banks in industrialized countries. It is
interesting to note that without a ‘commitment term’ in the Taylor rule, the
economy is no longer characterized by chaotic dynamics. More on this below
when we outline an agenda for future research.
When it comes to long swings in the exchange rate, this ﬁnding is
very interesting due to the fact that Engel and Hamilton (1990) found this
phenomenon when examining several exchange rates for the US Dollar. The
starting point for their research was the strong appreciation of the US Dollar
in the early 1980s and the subsequent depreciation of the same currency in the
second half of the same decade. Having in mind that the structural parameters
in the model are based on quarterly data, a typical period of appreciation or
depreciation of the exchange rate is around 10 years long. Even though this
period is a bit too long, the interesting thing is that the model, in fact, is able
to generate long swings in the exchange rate.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that our model essentially is a deterministic
model since there is only a cost-push shock in the initial time period and that
we have analyzed the behavior of the model when there are no transients.
In other words, it is not necessary to have a stochastic model to be able to
reproduce long swings in the exchange rate and to have erratic behavior in the
model’s variables.
Research agenda
One can easily think of several important directions for future research. First,
it would be interesting to implement the evolutionary switching mechanism
in a slightly diﬀerent manner than we did in this paper. For example, one
could augment the model with bond markets at home and abroad, and use
past proﬁts in currency trade as the performance measure. De Grauwe and
Grimaldi (2006a) is, therefore, a useful starting point since they implement
such a performance measure into an asset pricing model for the exchange rate.
Another research direction is to derive interest rate rules that implement
optimal policy, both under discretion and commitment in policy-making. This
type of research would be interesting to accomplish since it could give rise to
counter-intuitive results. Recall that we have chaotic dynamics when there is
a ‘commitment term’ in the Taylor rule, but that the dynamics is non-chaotic
21when this term is excluded from the rule. In other words, a policy that is
superior from a welfare perspective might introduce complicated dynamics in
the economy and a less predictable monetary policy. Of course, such a ﬁnding
would call for a closer examination of the microeconomic foundations of the
welfare function that the central bank is optimizing.
Finally, a third research direction would be to implement the mechanism
in Brock and Hommes (1997) into a DSGE model that has not been linearized
around steady state that, otherwise, is the typical case in the literature.
However, Eusepi (2007) is an interesting exception in which such a linearization
has not been done. It goes without saying that this type of research, especially
when the central bank is using an optimal policy rule in policy-making, can
be quite challenging, but at the same time interesting to accomplish.
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25Appendix
We make use of the following equations that are derived in Galí and Monacelli
(2005)
½
πt = πd,t + ζ∆st
st = et + p∗
t − pd,t
(A.1)
where s is the terms of trade, p∗ is the index of foreign goods prices, pd is the
index of domestic goods prices, and the asterisk denotes a foreign quantity.
Firstly, shift the ﬁrst equation in (A.1) one time period forward in time
Et (πd,t+1)=Et (πt+1) − ζEt (∆st+1) (A.2)









































· (πt − ζ (∆et + π
∗
t)) (A.5)
Finally, substitute (A.4) into the ﬁrst equation in (2.1), substitute (A.4)—(A.5)
into the second equation in (2.1), ignore variables in the foreign economy since
they can be treated as constants, and (2.2) is derived.
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